Wednesday, December 9, 2009
The World Cup Draw
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
World Cup Draw Preview
This horrendously boring event, which can be cringe-inducing in its mock seriousness and cheese factor, involves grown men and women drawing 32 balls (representing the qualified teams) from 4 glass pots and placing them into eight groups. To punch it up, there are lots of speeches and terrible musical performances. Despite this, the draw, which is televised in 170 countries, is expected to be watched by almost 200 million human beings.
Why? Because the draw matters. Matters, at least, to the billion or so people who care about the sport of football and its ultimate tournament, the World Cup. The aspirations of teams and nations to footballing glory will hang, in some measure, on the result of the draw.
FIFA announced the seeding for the tournament today and produced a first surprise: they abandoned the tradition of seeding based on performance in the last two World Cups and went with FIFA rankings as of October 2009. On this basis, France were excluded from one of the top seedings (which prevent the best teams from eliminating each other in the first round); while Holland moved into France's spot.
The #1 seeds will be spread out across the 8 groups, and include hosts South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, England, Holland, Germany, Italy, and Spain. No arguments there. Excluding France was extremely fair, given their poor form of late (and the taint of their qualification over Ireland on Thierry Henry's handball). It was equally fair for them to elevate Holland, who have been on a tear and are FIFA ranked 3rd in the world.
The other major decision FIFA made was to put the North American teams in Pot #2 with the relatively weak Asia/Oceania teams, rather than with the unseeded but stronger South American or African teams, who went into Pot #3. This was clearly done to enhance the likelihood of African teams making the elimination rounds, but makes it much more difficult for the USA and Mexico, who would have had a high probability of drawing South Africa, the weakest seeded team by far, in the group stage.
From the USA perspective, the best case would be: 1. South Africa (or England, who always suck outside Europe); 3. Paraguay (or Algeria, if #1 is England); and 4. Slovakia or Slovenia. The worst case would be 1. Brazil or Spain; 3. Ivory Coast or Chile; and 4. France or Portugal.
And then there is the proverbial "Group of Death." Every World Cup has one, or at least a debate about which of the several tough groups truly constitutes this cup's Group of Death. The GoD refers to a group in which at least three strong teams are drawn together, meaning that one pre-tournament contender gets sent packing before the elimination round. There's a chance for a Brazil, Mexico, Ivory Coast, Portugal group, or a Spain, USA, Cameroon, France group.
When the dust settles, and we've endured Sepp Blatter, and Charlize Theron, and David Beckham, the freaking Soweto Gospel Choir, Johnny Clegg, et al., at least we'll have a tournament.
Sunday, June 28, 2009
Confederations Cup Final
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
USA in Confederations Cup Final
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
Thoughts on the American Idol Finale
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
A Costly Price War
I've talked quite a bit in the past about the turning point that the year 2004 represented in the video game business. To recap, in that year the internet revolution finally rocked the game business to its core, with electronic distribution and new business models reaching mainstream acceptance. Between the release of World of Warcraft, the launch of Half Life 2 through Steam, the Shanda, TenCent and JAMDAT IPOs, and several other events, 2004 was a watershed year for the industry. I've argued that the nature of value creation in the video game business, traditionally grounded on intellectual property ownership and retail distribution, was forever disrupted.
But something else of great importance happened in 2004 that often gets overlooked in critical reviews of the business. It was much more subtle and easy to miss -- a publisher launched a super high quality product and offered it for sale at a very low price. This relatively small act of busting the pricing cartel and using QPR (quality/price ratio) as a competitive weapon had profound implications for one of the industry's great companies.
The game was Sega/Take-Two's ESPN NFL 2K5. This American football simulation, developed by Visual Concepts, was first launched on the Sega Dreamcast in 1999. It was considered innovative, but hampered by it's exclusive association with Sega's poorly-accepted hardware platform. In 2001, the franchise went multi-platform, and in 2003 added the ESPN branding to its NFL license. Sega aimed the product directly at one of the most popular and successful video games of all time, EA Sports John Madden NFL Football, with limited results. In 2003, Madden outsold 2K4 over 10-to-1.
In 2004, Sega agreed to co-publish 2K5 with Take-Two. The companies, faced with a daunting entrenched competitor but possessing a high quality product, took an innovative approach: they offered the game at retail for $19.99, less than half the price of Madden. And they sold boatloads. They went from less than 10% unit share of the football category, to well over 30%, and expanded the overall market.
The success of the 2K5 strategy provoked an extremely aggressive response from EA. By the end of December 2004, EA announced a five year exclusive licensing arrangement with the NFL and the NFL Players' Association. By the end of January 2005, they added a 15 year deal with ESPN, effectively stripping the 2K franchise of its branding (and most of it's legitimacy as a football simulation).
But EA accomplished this at tremendous cost. At the time of the deal, there was speculation that EA paid in excess of $300MM for these rights. Let's do some math. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that number is correct. It creates a royalty burden of $60MM per year for each of the five years of the deal, that must be amortized across units sold. Assuming 5 million units sold at $35 wholesale (it's likely more units at a blended lower wholesale), that's a royalty burden of $12 per unit, or over 33%. Based on my direct experience as an NFL/NBA/MLB licensee at JAMDAT, that's almost twice what we paid for non-exclusive rights to the league and players' association in a typical deal.
Play that out a little further. That's over $25MM annually that would have dropped to EA's bottom line, or around 8 cents per share. Just to give you a little perspective, EA earned 75 cents per share in fiscal '06 and 24 cents per share in '07. They lost $1.45 per share in fiscal '08.
EA accomplished their goal of eliminating the 2K series as a competitive threat (in fact, they eliminated it as a product altogether), but at tremendous cost to profitability from one their most reliable profit contributors, Madden. At the time, the analysts lined up to praise the deal, assuming that EA knew what it was doing and that they could grow the football market to accommodate the increased royalties. But I wonder how many of them would think it was anything other than a Pyrrhic victory now.
Friday, April 17, 2009
Strat Planning
Following up on my post about OODA, I thought I'd expand a little on the reason for strategic planning and some specific methods I've used in the past to facilitate planning.
One of the important lessons that Colonel Boyd derived from his study of military history was the importance of decentralized decision-making and field-level initiative. As the military has applied Boyd's concepts on the modern battlefield, this lesson has been further reinforced. Quoting from the Boyd Wikipedia entry:
"... [T]he most effective organizations have a highly decentralized chain of command that utilizes objective-driven orders, or directive control, rather than method-driven orders in order to harness the mental capacity and creative abilities of individual commanders at each level."
This only works if you have (1) creative, intelligent commanders (or managers in business); and (2) a strategic framework that establishes common objectives and helps establish a context for orientation, the second "O" in OODA. This orientation context is vitally important -- I like to call it a "shared hallucination" of the company's place and purpose. Managers need the flexibility to make quick decisions, but unless those decisions are consistent with the overall strategy of the organization, the results can be haphazard and uncoordinated.
Clear, simple articulation of corporate strategy is crucial. I have primarily used two tools to help me do this: a recursive goal-objective-strategy-metrics approach to writing the annual plan, and a threat map.
In my recursive goal-objective-strategy-metrics approach, the CEO establishes the top-level plan. This plan is comprised of a single, overall goal for the company (a thing to be accomplished, not a mission statement), some key objectives that support the goal, the strategies necessary to achieve the goal and satisfy the objectives, and some metrics by which success can be measured. This top-level plan should fit on a single page.
The recursive aspect of this approach is that each of the strategies from this top-level plan becomes a goal for the next level plan. So if one of the top-level strategies is "Finish the product before Christmas," the VP of production gets this as her goal and will develop objectives, strategies and metrics to reach it. This can get pushed down even further into the organization, so departmental managers get an annual goal and articulate their objectives, strategies and metrics.
The beauty of this approach is that it rolls perfectly back up into the master plan. If you want to know why the art department is outsourcing to China, for example, you can see that it satisfies their goal of delivering all art assets in September for $1MM, which serves the higher goal of shipping for Christmas on budget, which serves the top-level objective of reaching cash flow break-even by the end of Q1. And if one of the lower-level strategies fails, if China outsourcing can't deliver by September, you can change it to something else consistent with the overall goal. And that change propagates up and down the chain.
In practice, I only used this tool at the top-level and one level down, as a way to coordinate strategy at the VP level. But it worked to keep everyone on the same page. Actually, the process of writing and critiquing the plan as a team was more important than the resulting document, because the process surfaced tensions, fostered debate, and led to a better plan.
The other strategic planning tool I really like is the threat map. The way I create a threat map is to put my business in the center of a series of three concentric circles. The first circle closest to the center represents the immediate, near-term competitive threats, the next circle represents the medium-term threats that might arise in certain circumstances, and the outer circle represents the long-term threats.
Radiating out from the center I draw several axes, representing the things that will make the company successful (or its key vulnerabilities). I then place the competitive companies and market trends on the map, in the temporal bands, near the axis along which they are attacking my company. In addition to clarifying competitive threats, this was actually a great way to see opportunities, set priorities, and think about candidates for alliance, business development, and acquisition.
For example, in the case of JAMDAT, we had three axes: intellectual property, distribution, and game quality/innovation. On our map, we identified EA early on as a medium-term threat to us via intellectual property, so we sought to license the most dangerous of their properties from them, effectively neutralizing their threat and co-opting their advantage against us for several years.
Another example: we identified content aggregators as threats to our direct distribution relationships with carriers. In response, we carefully avoided using them as an alternative to the lengthy carrier sales process, even at the cost of immediate and incremental revenue, so we wouldn't inadvertently strengthen the aggregators' collective market position against us. This is a perfect application of strategy to value creation; the default response of the sales team would have been to simply maximize revenue, but that would have diminished our long-term competitive advantage.
Ultimately, the threat map and the annual plan are just tools. Without intelligence, creative thinking, and decisiveness in execution, the best laid plans are worthless. These tools can help direct a good team, but they can just as easily reveal weak organizational design and bad hires. Caveat emptor.